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Law, Fiscal Federalism, and Austerity
R. DANIEL KELEMEN*
ABSTRACT
In response to the Eurozone crisis, European Union leaders have
undertaken a number of dramatic reforms, including the imposition of a
new regime for fiscal governance of Eurozone Member States. The 2012
Fiscal Compact Treaty, one of the lynchpins of this package of reforms,
requires states to incorporate judicially enforceable balanced-budget
rules into national law. This article explores this effort to judicialize
austerity in the European Union, focusing on two interrelated sets of
questions. First, why did EU leaders turn to the courts and ask them to
become the stewards of fiscal discipline, and second, should we expect the
effort to judicialize fiscal discipline through the Fiscal Compact to work?
I argue that after the failure of the Maastricht Eurozone governance
regime, Member State governments concluded that the enforcement of
fiscal rules must be shielded from political interference and entrenched
at the national level, where national courts could assure that EU rules
were respected by reluctant governments. Nevertheless, I conclude that
these efforts will fail because they are based on a misunderstanding of
when and how fiscal rules are actually enforced. The vague character of
the balanced budget rules adopted in the Fiscal Compact Treaty along
with other background conditions in the structure of the Eurozone mean
that the rules are unlikely to be enforced.
INTRODUCTION
The Eurozone crisis exposed, in dramatic fashion, the inadequacies
of the economic governance regime put in place when the Euro common
currency was created. In response to the crisis, European Union (EU)
leaders have undertaken a number of dramatic reforms including the
establishment of a permanent bailout fund,' the partial (and ongoing)
* R. Daniel Kelemen is a Professor of Political Science at Rutgers University.
1. The establishment of this fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), is
discussed below. The ESM was created through an intergovernmental treaty signed by
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construction of a banking union, 2 and the imposition of a new regime for
fiscal governance of Eurozone Member States. The Fiscal Compact
constitutes one of the lynchpins of this package of reforms. 3 The core of
the Fiscal Compact involves an effort to judicialize austerity by
requiring states to incorporate judicially enforceable balanced-budget
rules into national law.4 Of course, fiscal rules had been part of
Eurozone governance from the outset. The Maastricht Treaty, which
created the original legal framework for the Eurozone common currency
area, had established limits on deficit and debt levels for Eurozone
states.5 In 1997, to strengthen and reinforce these fiscal supervision and
enforcement provisions of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Union
adopted the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).6  However, this
"Maastricht regime" of fiscal governance left the enforcement of these
rules mostly up to political actors in the Commission and Council-with
a limited role for European courts. The Maastricht Treaty began to
break down in the mid-2000s and was abandoned altogether in the
midst of the crisis.7 In redesigning Eurozone governance with the 2012
Eurozone governments on February 2, 2012. See Treaty Establishing the European
Stability Mechanism, art. 3, Feb. 2, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseDOC-12-
3_en.htm (multilateral treaty establishing the ESM as a means "to safeguard the financial
stability of the euro area as a whole and of its Member States").
2. See David Howarth & Lucia Quaglia, The Steep Road to European Banking Union:
Constructing the Single Resolution Mechanism, 52 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 125, 125
(2014) (discussing the purpose and reasoning behind the construction of a European
banking union, including to "restore confidence in European banking systems weakened
by... the international financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis").
3. Formally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic
and Monetary Union (TSCG), which took effect on January 1, 2013. Treaty on Stability,
Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, Mar. 2, 2012,
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-releaseDOC-12-2-en.htm [hereinafter TSCG]. On the TSCG,
see generally Paul Craig, The Stability, Coordination and Governance Treaty: Principle,
Politics and Pragmatism, 37 EuR. L. REv. 231 (2012) (discussing the role of the TCSG as
one of many EU responses to the global financial crisis and ensuing crisis with the euro).
4. TSCG, supra note 3, art. 3. See infra Part III for further discussion of the TSCG.
5. Formally, the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which took effect on November 1,
1993. See Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 104c, Protocol on the Excessive
Deficit Procedure, 31 I.L.M. 247 (discussing deficit and debt rules and enforcement
mechanisms) [hereinafter TEU].
6. The SGP took the form of two Council Regulations. For discussion of the aims of
Council Regulations and their relationship with the SGP, see Council Regulation 1466/97,
on the Strengthening of the Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and
Coordination of Economic Policies, 2d recital, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 1 (EC); Council Regulation
1467/97, on Speeding Up and Clarifying the Implementation of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure, 3d recital, 1997 O.J. (L 209) 6 (EC) [hereinafter Council Regulations].
7. See generally R. Daniel Kelemen, Europe's New Normal, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (May
16, 2012), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137642/r-daniel-kelemen/europes-new-
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Fiscal Compact, EU leaders sought to reduce political discretion and to
call on courts to enforce deficit and debt limits on governments.
This article explores these recent efforts to judicialize austerity in
the European Union, focusing on two interrelated sets of questions.
First, in reforming Eurozone governance, why did EU leaders turn to
the courts and ask them to become the stewards of fiscal discipline? I
argue that when establishing a common currency, the European Union
faced a moral hazard problem that is common to federal and quasi-
federal systems: the European Union needed to find a credible way to
discourage Member States from building up unsustainable debts and
then turning to the European Union for a bailout.8 As mentioned above,
the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact included a
number of provisions designed to address this issue, but EU member
governments eventually disregarded these provisions. From the failure
of the Maastricht regime, Member State governments took the lesson
that the enforcement of fiscal rules must be shielded from political
interference and entrenched at the national level. Following a pattern of
governance--"Eurolegalism" 9-that is common in many fields of EU
normal (discussing the impact of the financial crisis on the European Union and
considering proposed solutions).
8. On the notion of moral hazard in the context of fiscal federalism see generally
Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral
Hazard, 64 ECONOMETRICA 623 (1996) (analyzing the tradeoff between risk-sharing and
moral hazard in fiscal federalism by contrasting the fiscal constitutions of vertically and
horizontally ordered systems); Jonathan Rodden, The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism, 46
AM. J. POL. SCI. 670 (2002) (analyzing cross-national data to discuss the effects of fiscal
and political institutions on the performance of subnational governments); Jdrgen von
Hagen & Barry Eichengreen, Federalism, Fiscal Restraints and European Monetary
Union, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 134 (1996) (discussing the interaction of fiscal restrictions such
as the Excessive Deficit Procedure with federalism in the EU context); Erik Wibbels,
Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI.
687 (2000) (arguing that macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances in developing federal
nations are influenced by political and fiscal institutions that create incentives for
subnational governments to avoid fiscal adjustment). On the role of moral hazard in the
particular context of Eurozone governance see generally Erik Jones, Liberalized Capital
Markets, State Autonomy, and European Monetary Union, 42 EUR. J. POL. RES. 111 (2003)
(discussing how EU monetary union has increased macroeconomic flexibility with varying
impacts on financial volatility in different countries); Erik Jones, Merkel's Folly, 52
SURVIVAL 21, 23 (2010) [hereinafter Jones, Merkel's Folly] (discussing the role of moral
hazard in contributing to the 2009 fiscal crisis in Greece and the subsequent impact of this
crisis on the rest of the European Union); R. Daniel Kelemen & Terence K. Teo, Law,
Focal Points and Fiscal Discipline in the United States and the European Union, 108 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 355 (2014) (applying analysis of fiscal discipline in the United States to the
European Union to argue that balanced budget rules can restrain sovereign debt and
lower sovereign borrowing costs, even in the absence of judicial enforcement).
9. R. DANIEL KELEMEN, EUROLEGALISM: THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW AND
REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 7-8 (2011).
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policy making, they sought to harness national courts to act as agents of
the European Union, enforcing its policies on reluctant governments.
Thus, the 2012 Fiscal Compact sought to judicialize fiscal policy by
empowering national courts to enforce deficit and debt limits.
Second, the paper explores whether the effort to judicialize fiscal
discipline through the Fiscal Compact will work. I argue that these
efforts will fail because they are based on a misunderstanding of how
fiscal rules actually operate.1 0 In practice, courts rarely enforce balanced
budget rules, such as those at the heart of the Fiscal Compact. When
governments respect such rules they do so not out of concern about
judicial enforcement, but due to concern about bond market reactions to
violation of the rules. For bond markets to enforce fiscal rules
effectively, however, the rules must be very clear. The vague character
of the balanced budget rules adopted in the Fiscal Compact 1 along with
other background conditions in the structure of the Eurozone such as
the fact that the European Union has established a permanent bailout
fund (the European Stability Mechanism), 12 mean that bond markets
are unlikely to effectively enforce them.
The remainder of the article is divided into four parts. Part I
examines the background conditions and political context that led to the
failure of the original Maastricht Treaty-based regime for Eurozone
governance. Part II explains why EU leaders reacted to the failure of
the Maastricht regime by embracing a strategy that would have courts
enforce fiscal discipline. Part III explains why the effort to judicially
mandate compliance with fiscal policy by including legally enforceable
balanced budget rules in the Fiscal Compact is likely to prove
ineffective. Finally, the conclusion asks what broader lessons can be
drawn about the relationship between law, fiscal federalism, and
austerity in the European Union and beyond.
I. THE FAILURE OF THE MAASTRICHT REGIME OF EUROZONE GOVERNANCE
From its inception, the Eurozone faced a moral hazard problem
common to any federal or nonfederal system that shares a common
currency and a single market but in which Member States control
substantial aspects of fiscal policy. Any such system must find a credible
10. See Kelemen & Teo, supra note 8, at 365 (arguing that the EUs effort to judicialize
the fiscal process will fail).
11. TSCG, supra note 3, art. 3.
12. See Bruno de Witte, The European Treaty Amendment for the Creation of a
Financial Stability Mechanism, EUR. POLy ANALYSIS, June 2011, at 5-6.
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way to discourage states from building up unsustainable debt loads. 13
Problems may occur when one or more state governments find
themselves saddled with an unsustainable debt burden and default,
generating a host of negative spillover effects for other states or for the
federal government. The high spillover costs of a state default may
prompt the federal government to intervene to bail out the struggling
state. But a situation of moral hazard arises if the federal level is
perceived as guaranteeing the solvency of individual states. State
governments may be tempted to borrow excessively-and private sector
lenders may be tempted to indulge them-because all involved believe
that the federal government will bail states out if their debt becomes
unsustainable. Likewise, even fiscally prudent states may be tempted to
regulate their banking sectors in a lax manner, believing that if lax
regulation leads to a financial crisis that threatens the solvency of the
state, the federal government will bail out the state.
One option for how the federal system can address this moral
hazard problem is for the federal government to establish a credible
commitment not to bail out state governments. If the federal level can
establish a credible commitment that it will not bail out insolvent
states, then neither states nor bond markets will act in anticipation of
bailouts. The United States chose this path in the early 1840s when a
number of states faced debt crises. 14 A brief diversion into the history of
U.S. fiscal federalism helps to underline one viable path to addressing
the moral hazard that the European Union has not taken.
In the 1820s and 1830s, a number of state governments borrowed
heavily to finance infrastructure projects. When a financial crisis in
1839 was followed by a severe economic downturn, a number of state
governments could no longer service their debts. 15 They turned to the
federal government for assistance. Indeed, there was a precedent for
federal assistance to struggling states, as the federal government in
1790 had agreed to assume the debt that states had accumulated in the
course of the Revolutionary War. 16 But unlike in 1790, where the debt
13. See also sources cited supra note 8 (discussing strategies for, and the importance of,
federal systems limiting debt loads).
14. See generally William B. English, Understanding the Costs of Sovereign Default:
American State Debts in the 1840's, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 259 (1996) (scrutinizing the
defaults of the United States in the 1840s); Arthur Grinath, III et al., Debt, Default and
Revenue Structure: The American State Debt Crisis in the Early 1840s, 1 (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Res. Working Paper Series on Hist. Factors in Long Run Growth, Paper No. 97,
1997) (examining the cause of and remedy for the United States' 19th Century debt crisis).
15. John Joseph Wallis, What Caused the Crisis of 1839?, 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Res.
Working Paper Series on Hist. Factors in Long Run Growth, Paper No. 133, 2001).
16. Harold James, Alexander Hamilton's Eurozone Tour, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 5,
2012), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/alexander-hamilton-s-Eurozone-tour.
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had been incurred in a common military struggle, this time state debts
were the result of infrastructure investments and the federal
government responded differently. In 1841, the federal government
flatly refused to finance the debt several states had accumulated, and as
a result, eight states and the territory of Florida defaulted.17
The federal government's willingness to allow states to default
proved a defining event in the history of U.S. fiscal federalism. Allowing
several constituent states in the federation to default-with all the
economic pain and risk that entailed-established the federal
government's commitment to not bail out insolvent states as credible.
Creditors initially shunned the insolvent state governments. The states
then undertook dramatic reforms to reestablish their credibility vis-A-
vis lenders and regain access to the credit markets. Some states raised
tax rates or introduced altogether new taxes-such as property taxes-
to create new revenue streams that would bring their fiscal house in
order. The defaulting states introduced balanced budget laws, in many
cases entrenching them in their state constitutions. The states imposed
the rules on themselves in an effort to tie their own hands and regain
the confidence of wary investors to bring their borrowing costs down.'
8
Eventually forty-nine of the fifty states imposed such rules on
themselves even in the absence of any federal mandate to do so.19
The architects of the Maastricht regime of Eurozone governance
recognized the moral hazard described above and put in place a set of
rules designed to address it. First, the Maastricht Treaty included a no-
bailout clause (Article 104b, now Article 125 of the Treaty of the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), which stipulated that
neither the Community nor any individual Member State could bailout
(i.e., assume the debts of) another Member State.20 Second, the
Maastricht Treaty required that Member States avoid excessive
17. English, supra note 14, at 262; Grinath, III et al., supra note 14, at 4.
18. English, supra note 14, at 259-60.
19. See Federico Fabbrini, The Fiscal Compact, the "Golden Rule," and the Paradox of
European Federalism, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2013) (emphasizing that in
contrast to the situation in the European Union, the individual states of the United States
adopted balanced budget rules without being mandated to do so by the central
government).
20. TEU, supra note 5, art. 104b ('The Union shall not be liable for or assume the
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member State, without
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A
Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments,
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public
undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees
for the joint execution of a specific project").
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government deficits, 21 and put in place a detailed, punitive excessive
deficit procedure. 22 In short, the Excessive Deficit Procedure required
that annual deficits should not exceed 3 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP) and that accumulated debt should not exceed 60 percent
of GDP, though it included some qualifications and exceptions to these
rules that rendered them more flexible.23 The Excessive Deficit
Procedure also established a lengthy, multistage, and highly politicized
enforcement process. 24 At the conclusion of that process, if a state
refused to comply with the recommendations of the Council and rectify
its excessive deficit, the Council could, if it chose to do so, "require the
Member State concerned to make a non-interest-bearing deposit of an
appropriate size with the Community until the excessive deficit has, in
the view of the Council, been corrected"; 25 or the Council could, "impose
fines of an appropriate size."26 As noted above, EU leaders moved to
bolster these fiscal provisions of the Maastricht Treaty in 1997 by
adopting the SGP.
27
Thus before the launch of the euro currency, the European Union
had-at least on paper and in principle-implemented a system of
governance designed to limit the moral hazard associated with excessive
Member State deficits. But the application of this system in practice fell
far short of the principles laid down in the Treaty text, and when crisis
struck, the Maastricht regime of Eurozone governance was largely
abandoned as the European Union stepped in to bail out struggling
states. Contrasting the U.S. experience in the early 1840s with the
European Union's experience in the last five years underscores that, for
a "no-bailouts" commitment to be credible, words on paper alone are not
enough-indeed, they may not be necessary. Rather, the key to
credibility is that the federal government must demonstrate in practice
that it is willing to allow states to default.
21. See Id. art. 104c.
22. See the procedure elaborated in TEU, Protocol (No. 12) on the Excessive Deficit
Procedure, Feb. 7, 1992.
23. See Id. art. 104c(2)(a) (suggesting that exceptions to the deficit rules could be made
if, "the ratio has declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes
close to the reference value; or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value"). See also
Id. art. 104c(2)(b) (suggesting that exceptions to the deficit rules could be made if, "the
ratio is sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory
pace").
24. See Id. art. 104c(3)-(13).
25. See Id. art. 104c(11).
26. Id.
27. See Council Regulations, supra note 6.
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The rules on excessive deficit and debt set out in the Maastricht
Treaty and the SGP were the first elements of the Maastricht regime to
crumble. In one of the great ironies of the Eurozone saga, it was
Germany that played a decisive role in gutting the very rules it had
been so adamant about putting in place. In 2003, the European
Commission launched the Excessive Deficit Procedure against Germany
and France, two countries that were clearly in violation of the rules
stipulated in the SGP.28 Yet, when the time came for other Member
States in the European Council to back the Commission's
recommendations and pursue enforcement of the Excessive Deficit
Procedure, they balked. On November 25, 2003, at the 2,546th meeting
of the Council of Ministers, 29 the SGP and its Excessive Deficit
Procedure effectively died. At that meeting, a majority of Member
States backed Germany and France and agreed to suspend excessive
deficit proceedings against them. These Member States chose simply to
publish a set of "Political Conclusions"-recommendations for further
actions to assure the sustainability of public finances in the two
countries.3 0 The gutting of the SGP was formalized in 2005 when the
Council adopted a pair of Regulations that substantially loosened the
requirements of the SGP and Excessive Deficit Procedure.
31
The next pillar of the Maastricht governance regime to collapse was
the no-bailout clause. Again, and with equal irony, the German
government played a key role in undermining the credibility of this rule.
The story of the demise of the no-bailout clause began in October of
2008, when the Greek government first restated its deficit figures-
dramatically increasing them. Concerns about mounting debt in Greece,
along with concerns about repercussions from the U.S. financial crisis,
28. Stephen Castle, EU Rebukes Germany over Euro Rules, THE INDEPENDENT, Jan. 9,
2003, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/eu-rebukes-germany-
over-euro-rules-123454.html; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, France and Germany Smash
Euro Pact, THE TELEGRAPH, Nov. 26, 2003, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk
finance/2870055/France-and-Germany-smash-Euro-pact.html. The Commission had
warned it would initiate these sanctions already in 2002. See Budget Sanctions Hit
Germany and France, BBC NEWS, Nov. 19, 2002, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
business/2492339.stm.
29. In this case, the Council of Ministers was meeting as the Economic and Financial
Affairs Council.
30. Barbara Dutzler & Angelika Hable, The European Court of Justice and the
Stability and Growth Pact - Just the Beginning?, 9 EuR. INTEGRATION ONLINE PAPERS 1
(2005); MARTIN HEIPERTZ & AMY VERDUN, States, Intergovernmentalism and Negotiating
in the SGP, in RULING EUROPE: THE POLITICS OF THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT (2010).
31. See Council Regulation No. 1055/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 174) 1 (EC) (strengthening the
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic
policies); Council Regulation No. 1056/2005, 2005 O.J. (L 174) 5 (EC) (speeding up and
clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure).
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led investors to demand higher yields on Greek bonds. After adopting
the euro, Greece had enjoyed years of low borrowing costs nearly at
parity with those of Germany, but in the month after its budget
restatement the interest rate spread between Greece and Germany
increased dramatically-from eighty-nine basis points on October 1,
2008 to 165 basis points by the end of that month. 32 Greece's increased
borrowing costs reflected mounting concerns in the markets about the
risk that it might default on its debt-a clear possibility under the
Maastricht "no-bailout" regime. By early 2009, investors grew more
wary and the differential between Germany's borrowing costs and those
of Greece and other peripheral Eurozone economies continued to
increase. In a form of self-fulfilling prophecy, these increasing borrowing
costs themselves posed a risk to the solvency of Greece and other
peripheral Eurozone economies. In February 2009, German Finance
Minister Peer Steinbrfick stepped into the fray, stating publicly that
"the euro-region treaties don't foresee any help for insolvent countries,
but in reality the other states would have to rescue those running into
difficulty."33 Initially, his statement had the intended effect: it calmed
markets and brought down Greece's borrowing costs. At the same time,
Steinbriick's promise that no Eurozone state would be allowed to go
bankrupt effectively killed the Maastricht Treaty's no-bailout pledge.
By the end of 2009, concerns over Greece resurfaced. The Greek
government again restated its deficits in October 2009, this time
revealing that the levels were far higher than permitted under the
Maastricht rules. 34 At the same time, a change in the German coalition
government brought in a new finance minister, calling into question
whether Steinbriick's promise of assistance for states facing a debt crisis
would be honored. German Chancellor Angela Merkel fed the flames at
the March 2010 European Council summit by declaring that Germany
would only provide support to another Member State if it lost access to
private capital markets-in other words after it went bankrupt, but not
before. With this declaration, private capital flowed out of Greece and
Greek borrowing costs soared, finally leading Greece to seek a bailout
from the European Union and International Monetary Fund (IMF).35
Working with IMF officials, EU leaders first put in place an ad hoc
Hellenic Financial Stability Fund to support Greece and later
established a larger European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) to
32. Erik Jones, The Euro Versus the Markets, 55 ASPENIA 146, 149 (2012).
33. Rainer Buergin & Holger Elfes, Steinbrueck Says Euro States May Bail Out
Members (Update2), BLOOMBERG (Feb. 17, 2009, 11:12 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aGX4UExx.jOk.
34. See TEU, supra note 5.
35. See Jones, Merkel's Folly, supra note 8, at 21-22.
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support other Member States should they face a debt crisis. 36 Soon after
Greece sought assistance, Ireland and Portugal turned to the EFSF for
bailouts. Finally, in February 2011, EU leaders agreed to establish a
permanent bailout fund, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) to
eventually replace the temporary EFSF.37 With the establishment of a
permanent bailout fund in the ESM, the European Union formalized the
burial of the no-bailout provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. The
creation of the ESM was linked to the establishment of a new regime of
fiscal governance that promised to enforce fiscal discipline strictly and
to ensure financial stability. To understand that regime and the role
balanced budget rules played in it, it is first important to consider
precisely why the European Union chose to bail out struggling Eurozone
states, rather than to let them default as had been pledged in the
Maastricht Treaty-and as the United States had done in the 1840s.
The first consideration that drove EU leaders to renege on their "no-
bailout" pledge was fear of the repercussions of a disorderly Greek
default. EU leaders feared that the default of even one small Member
State, such as Greece, could have a domino effect, raising borrowing
costs and leading to defaults and bank failures across peripheral
Eurozone economies-with disastrous consequences for the Eurozone as
a whole. 38 If Greece defaulted-and possibly exited the euro-then
bondholders in Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and elsewhere might worry
about their country's potential for default and seek to unload their
holdings. This trend would send borrowing costs soaring and could lead
a series of countries to default. Likewise, savers across the more
vulnerable economies on the periphery of the Eurozone, concerned that
a financial crisis might bring down banks or that their savings might be
redenominated in a new currency, would be tempted to transfer their
funds to accounts in safer havens such as Germany. Such bank runs
could prompt bank failures across the periphery. Fears of such
contagion within the context of the integrated financial markets and
integrated banking system that the European Union had created led its
36. See generally Ledina Gocaj & Sophie Meunier, Time Will Tell: The EFSF, the ESM,
and the Euro Crisis, 35 J. EUR. INTEGRATION 239, 240-47 (2013) (detailing the creation of
the EFSF).
37. See de Witte, supra note 12.
38. For instance, on April 20, 2010, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble
pleaded with German citizens to support a bailout of Greece. "'We cannot allow the
bankruptcy of a Euro member state like Greece to turn into a second Lehman Brothers,'
he told Der Spiegel. 'Greece's debts are all in Euros, and it isn't clear who holds how much
of those debts. The consequences of a national bankruptcy would be incalculable. Greece is
just as systemically important as a major bank."' Gary Dorsch, Could Greek Debt Tragedy
Morph into a Lehman Meltdown Market Crash?, MARKET ORACLE (Apr. 28, 2010, 2:43
AM), marketoracle.co.ukIArticlel8997.html.
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leaders to conclude that the risks of Greek default were too high to
countenance.
39
The second set of considerations was more political, focusing on how
the blame for bailouts and other crisis related measures would be
apportioned. Financial institutions in core countries, such as Germany
and France, held substantial portions of Greece's sovereign debt, and
more generally they held substantial portfolios of sovereign debt and
loans to countries across the periphery of the Eurozone. A disorderly
default by Greece-particularly if it generated spillovers for other
southern economies-could have threatened the solvency of banks in the
core. The risk of such bank failures would have generated pressure on
core governments to bail out their own banks.
So, Germany and other lender countries faced a choice that was not
simply between providing bailouts to governments of peripheral
Eurozone economies or not providing bailouts. Rather, it was a choice
between bailing out peripheral governments or bailing out their own
banks that were exposed to bad debt in those countries. For countries
like Germany and France, it was politically more palatable to bail out
debtor countries than to let them default and then have to bail out their
own banks. 40 This tendency was motivated by how the blame for
bailouts is apportioned. When a creditor country bails out a debtor,
voters tend to blame the debtor country-for example, when Germans
criticized supposedly profligate and lazy Greeks for their financial
crisis.41 By contrast, if a government bails out its own banks, voters are
39. The dynamics in the 1840s United States were very different as nearly all the state
bonds in question were held by European creditors, wholly outside the U.S. political
system. While defaults by some U.S. states could have wreaked havoc on financial
institutions in Europe, the defaults of individual states posed little direct risk to financial
institutions in other U.S. states. In the European Union by contrast, financial institutions
in fellow EU states held many of the bonds of other heavily indebted EU states. See
English, supra note 14, at 261.
40. As many commentators have noted, the bailouts extended to Greece and other
countries on the Eurozone periphery were largely channeled through those governments
to pay back debts to banks in Germany, France and other core countries. See, e.g., Ben
Chu, Germany Is Not Bailing Out Europe, It Is Rescuing Itself, INDEPENDENT (July 5,
2012), http://www.independent.co.uklnews/business/commentfben-chu-germany-is-not-
bailing-out-europe-it-is-rescuing-itself-7912743.html (discussing how Germany's decision
to assist struggling nations was also done to help German banks); Gareth Gore & Sudip
Roy, German Banks Win Big from Spain Bailout, REUTERS (June 29, 2012, 6:46 PM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/29/spain-germany-bailout-ifr-idINL6E8HTFC82120629
(describing how some of the biggest beneficiaries of the Spanish bank bailout were
German banks).
41. See Yiannis Mylonas, Media and the Economic Crisis of the EU: The
'Culturalization' of a Systemic Crisis and Bild-Zeitung's Framing of Greece, 10 TRIPLEC:
COGNITION, COMM., Co-OPERATION 646, 665-66 (2012) (describing the depictions of
Greeks in the German media during the crisis).
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likely to blame that government for giving handouts to wealthy,
irresponsible bankers.
42
II. THE NEW EUROZONE GOVERNANCE REGIME AND THE TURN TO THE
COURTS
The foregoing considerations explain why EU Member States did
not allow Greece or other beleaguered Member States to default, and
why they instead established a permanent architecture for bailouts with
the ESM. But providing bailouts without conditions would have only
exacerbated the moral hazard problem, tempting Member States to
build up unsustainable debts with the expectation they would be bailed
out. There could be no bailouts without conditionality, so the EU money
came with legally enforceable strings attached. At the behest of
Germany and other lender countries, the European Union put in place a
new regime of Eurozone fiscal governance.43 The new regime imposed
balanced budget rules, which forced some states to pursue austerity. It
backed these rules with the threat of judicial enforcement in an attempt
to ensure that politicians would not block their enforcement as they had
blocked enforcement of the SGP in the mid-2000s. 44 In short, the judicial
enforcement of austerity was the quid pro quo for the financial rescue of
states on the verge of default.
The new regime was comprised of a number of legal instruments
designed to strengthen budget discipline and to broaden the reach of
macroeconomic policy coordination to cover economic imbalances beyond
the fiscal domain. The surveillance and enforcement mechanisms of the
SGP were strengthened with the so-called "six pack," a package of five
regulations and one directive adopted in November 2011. 4 5 But some EU
42. It is also important to note that if Germany or other creditor countries had bailed
out their own banks directly, such payments would have added to their own country's
sovereign debt. By contrast, when creditor countries extend long-term, below market rate
loans to Greece or other debtor countries, which then use those loans to repay debts to
banks in the core countries, these loans are not booked as losses in accounting terms and
do not officially add to sovereign debt figures for the creditor countries. See Jacob Soll,
Greece's Accounting Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2015, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2015/O1/21/opinion/greeces.accounting-problem.html?_r=O.
43. See Kelemen, supra note 7.
44. See supra, Part I.
45. Council Regulation 1173/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 1 (EU); Council Regulation
1174/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 8 (EU); Council Regulation 1175/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 12
(EU); Council Regulation 1176/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 25 (EU); Council Regulation
1177/2011, 2011 O.J. (L 306) 33 (EU); Council Directive 2011/85/EU, 2011 O.J. 41 (EU);
Later, the "six-pack" was supplemented by a pair of new regulations-the so-called 'two-
pack'-that further enhanced EU supervision of Member state budgets. See Council
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leaders, above all German Chancellor Angela Merkel, saw such
legislative changes alone as inadequate, and demanded that fiscal
discipline be bolstered through an amendment of the EU Treaties. In
early December 2011, Merkel and Nicolas Sarkozy, the French
President, agreed to push for a revision of the EU treaties that would
give EU authorities a more powerful role in approving national budgets
and would demand that Member States enshrine automatic, "binding
debt brakes" in national law-subject to ECJ oversight.46 After the U.K.
government vetoed a revision of the EU Treaties in December 2011,
4 7
leaders of Eurozone countries agreed that they would adopt an
intergovernmental treaty outside the scope of EU law and leave it open
to other EU Member States to join. Finally, on January 30, 2012,
twenty-five member governments agreed to the terms of the Fiscal
Compact, 48 a new intergovernmental treaty outside the scope of EU
law.49 This treaty was tied to the European Union's new bailout regime
because EU states could only qualify for support from the European
Stability Mechanism if they ratified the Fiscal Compact.50
Among other reforms, the Fiscal Compact altered the European
Union's approach by emphasizing the judicial enforcement of austerity.
Whereas the Maastricht regime had left considerable discretion in the
hands of the Council of Ministers and Commission, the Fiscal Compact
requires signatory states to enshrine a structurally balanced budget
rule and an automatic debt brake in domestic law, so that national
courts can enforce them.5 1 The Fiscal Compact demands 52 that the
Regulation 472/2013, 2013 O.J. (L 104) 1 (EU); Council Regulation 473/2013, 2013 O.J. (L
140) 1 (EU).
46. Steven Erlanger, Sarkozy and Merkel Push for Changes to Europe Treaty, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/world/europe/leaders-piece-
together-an-effort-to-keep-the-euro-intact.html.
47. See Ian Traynor et al., David Cameron Blocks EU Treaty with Veto, Casting Britain
Adrift in Europe, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2011, 3:34 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2011/dec/09/david-cameron-blocks-eu-treaty.
48. Formally, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance in the Economic
and Monetary Union, Feb. 1, 2012.
49. See Peter Spiegel, Victory for Merkel Over Fiscal Treaty, FIN. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2012,
11:25 PM), http://www.ft.comlint]Icms/s/O/9068548a-4b68-1lel-b980-OO144feabdcO.html#
axzz3TB8TBZqQ. The treaty was signed at the EU summit on March 2, 2012. See also
Quentin Peel et al., Eurozone States Sign up to Fiscal Pact, FIN. TIMES (March 2, 2012,
12:03 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/l18cale8O-6455-1lel-b5Oe-OO144feabdcO.html#
axzz3TB8TBZqQ.
50. Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, Feb. 1, 2012, recital (5)
(stating, "It is acknowledged and agreed that the granting of financial assistance in the
framework of new programmes under the ESM will be conditional, as of 1 March 2013, on
the ratification of the TSCG by the ESM Member concerned").
51. See TSCG supra note 3, art. 3(1).
52. See Id. art. 3(2).
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balanced budget rules be entrenched in national law, "through
provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably
constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and
adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes." This provision
seeks to enforce fiscal policy at the national level by requiring Member
States to provide a legal basis for litigation to enforce balanced budget
rules before national courts.
Harnessing national courts to enforce EU fiscal policy rules follows
a well-established pattern in EU governance that I have labeled
Eurolegalism. 53 As in other policy areas, the European Union is seeking
to make up for its lack of a strong centralized administrative apparatus
or large central budget by leveraging domestic courts to pursue its
policy objectives. Moreover, the Treaty provides for another tier of
judicial enforcement by providing the ECJ with a role in ensuring that
Member States actually put in place the balanced budget rule
enforcement mechanisms demanded by Article 3(2).54 Article 8(1) of the
Fiscal Compact states that if any state signatory to the agreement
concludes that another state has failed to comply with Article 3(2), the
concluding state can raise the matter before the ECJ and that, "the
judgment of the Court of Justice shall be binding on the parties to the
proceedings, which shall take the necessary measures to comply with
the judgment within a period to be decided by the Court of Justice."55
In a broad sense, the Fiscal Compact seeks to impose a system
similar to the one that emerged from the bottom up in the United States
from the 19th Century. In both cases, Member States embed balanced
budget rules in state law (in forty-nine out of fifty states in the United
States and twenty-five out of twenty-eight states in the European
Union). The paths taken to arrive at these rules and the institutional
context that surrounds them, however, differ in important ways. In the
United States, the federal government let states default, and then
states imposed balanced budget rules on themselves to win the
confidence of lenders. 56 In contrast, the European Union established a
53. See KELEMEN, supra note 9, at 8.
54. See TSCG, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
55. Finally, the Fiscal Compact provides for a second level of ECJ oversight. If a Party
to the Treaty finds that another Party has failed to an ECJ judgment in a ruling pursuant
to Art. 8(1), then, "it may bring the case before the Court of Justice and request the
imposition of financial sanctions following criteria established by the European
Commission in the framework of Article 260 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union. If the Court of Justice finds that the Contracting Party concerned has
not complied with its judgment, it may impose on it a lump sum or a penalty payment
appropriate in the circumstances and that shall not exceed 0,1 % of its gross domestic
product." TSCG, supra note 3, art. 8(1)-(2).
56. See Fabbrini, supra note 19, at 28.
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bailout mechanism for states, but forced them to adopt balanced budget
rules as a condition of access to bailout funds. As discussed in the next
section, these background conditions, along with the specific character
of the balanced budget rules introduced in the United States, have
profound implications for their effectiveness.
III. WILL THE FISCAL COMPACT WORK?
With the new regime of fiscal governance described above now in
place, questions concerning its ability to work will be answered. Will the
domestically entrenched and "legally enforceable" balanced budget rules
required by the Fiscal Compact discourage states from building up
unsustainable deficits while simultaneously enabling them to borrow at
reasonable rates when necessary? In short, will the European Union's
effort to judicialize fiscal policy succeed? Unfortunately, since the Fiscal
Compact only took effect in January 2013, and a number of states only
ratified it in 2014, so it remains far too early for any definitive
assessment of its impact.
Although it is too early for a full assessment of the Fiscal Compact's
effectiveness, to date, there are few signs that the compact is working.
In the words of Daniel Gros and Cinzia Alcidi, "All this legal apparatus
seems to have had little impact on actual fiscal policy-making." 57 A
number of Member States' budgets seem to violate the terms of the
Fiscal Compact, yet the European Commission treats these budgets as
acceptable58 and domestic courts have not strictly enforced compliance
with the Fiscal Compact's balanced budget rules. Rather, courts have
balanced enforcement of these rules against the protection of other legal
norms.59 In some instances, this balancing act has led national courts to
strike down austerity measures that governments had imposed
specifically to comply with the requirements of the Fiscal Compact
because those measures violated other constitutionally protected values
such as equal treatment and fundamental rights to employment
57. Daniel Gros & Cinzia Alcidi, The Case of the Disappearing Fiscal Compact, in
CEPS COMMENTARY 1 (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Nov. 5, 2014).
58. See James Kanter, E. U. Gives 3 Nations More Time on Budgets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
29, 2014, at B2. As recently as November 2014, the European Commission refrained from
imposing disciplinary measures on Belgium, France and Italy despite the fact that their
budgets clearly violated the deficit and debt requirements of the Stability and Growth
Pact. Id.
59. See Federico Fabbrini, The Euro-Crisis and the Courts: Judicial Review and the
Political Process in Comparative Perspective, 32 BERKELEY J. INT'L LAW 64, 74-103 (2014)
(discussing judicial review of provisions of the Fiscal Compact by national and EU courts).
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security. 60 While it remains too early to conclude that the Fiscal
Compact is ineffective based on the limited empirical evidence available
to date, there are also convincing theoretical reasons to expect that the
balanced budget rules in the Fiscal Compact will prove ineffective.
The European Union's approach to fiscal discipline seems to be
based on the dominant understanding of how balanced budget rules
work to limit sovereign debt. The literature on balanced budget rules in
the U.S. suggests that these budget rules work better to constrain
borrowing and limit borrowing costs the stricter their judicial
enforcement mechanisms are.61 EU leaders' choices reflect this
perspective, as they emphasize the empowerment of national and EU
courts to strictly enforce deficit and debt limits.62 Thus, the Fiscal
Compact requires states to adopt balanced budget rules, "through
provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably
constitutional, or otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and
adhered to throughout the national budgetary processes" and to back
them with an automatic "correction mechanism."63
60. E.g., id. at 100 (discussing recent decisions of the Portuguese Constitutional
Tribunal).
61. See, e.g., Henning Bohn & Robert P. Inman, Balanced-budget Rules and Public
Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States, 45 CARNEGIE-ROCHESTER CONFERENCE SERIES ON
PUB. POL. 13, 23 (1996) ("Appointed supreme courts may behave more like a government
agency than a truly independent monitor of fiscal performance. Independently elected
supreme courts, on the other hand, are free of direct gubernatorial or legislative influences
and therefore hypothesized to be tougher monitors of fiscal policy."); Byron Lutz & Glenn
Follette, Fiscal Rules, What Does the American Experience Tell Us? 14 (Fed. Reserve Bd.,
Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Paper No. 38, 2012) ("[S]trong budget rules states
persistently maintain a stronger fiscal position than weak rule states").
62. Many scholars have drawn lessons for the Eurozone from the literature on U.S.
state balanced-budget rules. See Jiirgen von Hagen & Barry Eichengreen, Federalism,
Fiscal Restraints and European Monetary Union, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 134-35 (1996)
(arguing that borrowing limits of U.S. states were not set for the purpose of stabilizing the
U.S. dollar); Barry Eichengreen & Jirgen von Hagen, Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union:
Federalism, Fiscal Restrictions and the No-Bailout Rule (Centre for Econ. Pol'y Research,
Discussion Paper No. 1247, 1995)); Robert P. Inman, Do Balanced Budget Rules Work?
U.S. Experience and Possible Lessons for the EMU 4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 5838, 1996) (reviewing U.S. balanced budget rules to argue that they
are an effective fiscal management tool); Robert P. Inman, Transfers and Bailouts:
Enforcing Local Fiscal Discipline with Lessons from U.S. Federalism, in FISCAL
DECENTRALIZATION AND THE CHALLENGE OF HARD BUDGET CONSTRAINTS 35 (Jonathan
Rodden et al. eds., 2003) (reviewing fiscal performance of the U.S. state and local public
sector to identify institutional features that promote responsible local budgeting); Michael
D. Bordo et al., A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History 7-10, (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 17380, 2011) (analyzing U.S. establishment,
evolution of the federal sub-national government relationships, and debt history including
the development of bond markets and bailouts).
63. See TSCG, supra note 3, art. 3(2).
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But as Terence Teo and I show,64 courts almost never enforce
balanced budget rules, and fear of judicial enforcement does not explain
their effectiveness. The European Union's emphasis on strictness and
legal enforceability is misplaced because it is not courts, but the bond
markets, that provide the enforcement threat behind balanced budget
rules. And for bond markets, it is the clarity of the balanced budget
rules that matters, not their judicial enforceability.
To understand the role that a clear balanced budget rule can play in
restraining excessive deficit and debt, one must first understand why
bond markets often fail to restrain excessive borrowing. All too often,
bond markets allow a state to borrow at relatively low rates, until
revealed information or an institutional panic spikes borrowing costs
and renders the state insolvent. As Teo and I put it, "[i]nstead of playing
a helpful role deterring the accumulation of excessive debt, markets
often react too late and then so forcefully that they help drive states to
default."65 Balanced budget rules that are sufficiently clear can help
overcome this problem by creating a focal point that generates a shared
expectation among investors of the point at which other investors will
punish the sovereign by demanding higher rates on its debt. 66
This shared expectation is crucial, because investors care not only
about a state's economic fundamentals, but also about whether they
believe other bond buyers will continue to finance the state's debt at
reasonable rates. 67 A clear balanced budget rule can serve as a
coordinating device for bond markets by providing a focal point or fiscal
"red line," the crossing of which would be evident to all investors and
which would trigger all to demand much higher yields on sovereign
debt.68 Eager to avoid this coordinated market punishment, sovereigns
will seek to avoid violating the balanced budget rule in the first place.
However, bond markets can only play this disciplining role where
balanced budget rules have sufficient clarity such that it is obvious to
investors when the rules are broken. To support this theoretical claim,
we demonstrate empirically that the effectiveness of balanced budget
rules in the U.S. in fact does depend on their clarity, not on the
strictness of their judicial enforcement mechanisms. 69
64. Kelemen & Teo, supra note 8, at 356.
65. Id. at 357.
66. Id.
67. Investors care about what they believe other investors will do because a state's
solvency is, in part, a self-fulfilling prophecy: as long as bond markets are willing to
purchase sovereign bonds at reasonable yields, the state can remain solvent.
68. Investors' expectations of the behavior of other investors are crucial in this model.
The solvency of a state depends not only on its economic fundamentals, but also on the
willingness of creditors to hold its bonds.
69. Kelemen & Teo, supra note 8, at 362-365.
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This analysis suggests that the balanced budget rules in the Fiscal
Compact lack the clarity that would be necessary for them to serve as a
focal point for bond markets. In fact, precisely what would constitute a
balanced budget under the terms of the Fiscal Compact is extremely
vague and subject to interpretation. The language of Fiscal Compact
concerning balanced budgets starts out clearly enough, stating, "The
budgetary position of the general government... shall be balanced or in
surplus."70 But then come the qualifiers. In fact, the Fiscal Compact
does not require states to balance their budgets on an annual basis but
only to maintain "structurally balanced" budgets, which are balanced
across the multiyear business cycle. The Fiscal Compact becomes truly
abstruse when determining whether a budget is structurally balanced,
and is worth quoting at length:
[Tihe [balanced budget] rule under point (a) shall be
deemed to be respected if the annual structural balance
of the general government is at its country-specific
medium-term objective, as defined in the revised
Stability and Growth Pact, with a lower limit of a
structural deficit of 0,5 % of the gross domestic product
at market prices. The Contracting Parties shall ensure
rapid convergence towards their respective medium-
term objective. The time-frame for such convergence will
be proposed by the European Commission taking into
consideration country-specific sustainability risks.
Progress towards, and respect of, the medium-term
objective shall be evaluated on the basis of an overall
assessment with the structural balance as a reference,
including an analysis of expenditure net of discretionary
revenue measures, in line with the revised Stability and
Growth Pact.
71
Investors would be hard pressed to find a clear fiscal red line in the
opaque language of the Fiscal Compact. Not only is the Treaty's concept
of structurally balanced budget subject to interpretation, the Treaty also
allows for exceptions to even this fuzzy rule. States may "temporarily
deviate" from the budget rules in "exceptional circumstances," 72 which
the Treaty defines as, "the case of an unusual event outside the control
of the Contracting Party concerned which has a major impact on the
70. TSCG, supra note 3, art. 3(1)(a).
71. Id. art. 3(1)(b).
72. Id. art. 3(1)(c).
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financial position of the general government or to periods of severe
economic downturn."73 It is far from clear what exactly constitutes a
cyclically adjusted, structurally balanced budget or what might
constitute "exceptional" circumstances. Therefore, just what constitutes
a violation of the European Union's balanced budget rules will be
subject to lengthy, and highly political, debates.
National Parliaments must settle these debates. The domestic
measures put in place to implement requirements of the Fiscal Compact
have tended to empower Parliaments to determine when an emergency
situation exists that would justify a derogation from balanced budget
rules. In turn, a government's majority in parliament will determine
whether the government is justified in violating balanced budget rules.
74
National courts may review decisions by governments and parliaments
to derogate from balanced budget rules, but the experience of judicial
review of such questions in the European Union to date, and historically
in the United States, suggests that we should expect courts to take a
largely deferential approach.7 5 Finally, experience to date suggests that
EU institutions will also grant Member States considerable flexibility in
deviating from the balanced budget requirements of the SGP and the
Fiscal Compact.
76
Finally, aside from their lack of clarity, the European Union's
balanced budget rules are likely to fail because the literature on fiscal
federalism suggests that bondholders will only discipline excessive state
borrowing and discourage the accumulation of unsustainable debts if
they do not anticipate that insolvent states would be bailed out by the
73. Id. art. 3(3)(b).
74. See Giacomo Delledonne, A Legalization of Financial Constitutions in the EU?
Reflections on the German, Spanish, Italian and French Experiences, in THE
CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EUROPEAN BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS 194 (Maurice Adams et
al. eds., 2014) (discussing reforms in Germany, Spain and Italy that empower
parliamentary majorities to declare when derogations from balanced budget rules and
debt brakes are warranted).
75. See Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits
and State Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L. J. 907, 939-940 (2003) (discussing the
deferential posture U.S. courts have taken to enforcing state balanced budget rules);
Fabbrini, supra note 19, at 22 (discussing the largely deferential posture national courts
have taken to enforcing the Fiscal Compact's balanced budget rules); see also Delledonne,
supra note 74, at 195-96 (discussing the U.S. experience).
76. See generally Counsel Regulations and Directives, supra note 45. Also note,
regarding the possibility of review by the European Court of Justice provided in the Fiscal
Compact, that the European Commission is not permitted to bring enforcement action
against states. Rather, only Member State parties to the TSCG are empowered to bring
enforcement action against one another. More than five decades of experience with
enforcement actions before the ECJ confirm that Member States almost never bring
enforcement actions against one another. See also sources cited supra note 42.
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federal government. 77 Thus, in the United States, the fact that the
federal government had established a credible commitment to not bail
out state governments provided a crucial support for the efficacy of state
balanced budget rules.7 8 By contrast, if bond markets expect the federal
center to bail out insolvent states, they may be happy to ignore any
fiscal rules and continue lending even when debts appear
unsustainable. Indeed, the anticipation of bailouts helps explain why
Greek borrowing costs remained so low after the introduction of the
euro-even as Greece's debt-to-GDP ratio grew to dangerous levels.79 As
noted above, the new regime of fiscal governance put in place in
response to the Eurozone crisis includes a permanent bailout fund-the
ESM. The establishment of the ESM, a permanent bailout mechanism,
is likely to undermine the efficacy of bond market discipline, regardless
of the level of clarity of balanced budget rules.
CONCLUSION
We can draw broader lessons about the relationship between law,
fiscal federalism, and austerity from the foregoing analysis of the
European Union's recent experience. The Fiscal Compact has only been
in force since January 2013, and it is too early to draw definitive
conclusions. But already the EU experience underscores a few
important themes when considered alongside those of other federal
systems.
The central overriding lesson is that the judicial enforcement of
fiscal discipline is unlikely to succeed. The experience of the European
Union to date and the experience of the United States historically
suggest that courts cannot be relied on to act as enforcers of fiscal
discipline. Courts generally take a deferential posture vis-A-vis elected
officials in the realm of fiscal policy, and when they consider the
enforcement of balanced budget rules, they balance these requirements
against other legal norms and rights that may lead them to reject
austerity measures. Thus if national leaders want to impose austerity
on themselves or one another, they should not look to the courts to
enforce fiscal rules.
Second, if lawmakers in the European Union or elsewhere wish to
deploy balanced budget rules as a mechanisms to constrain excessive
state borrowing, they must design these rules with a better
understanding of how the rules actually work and under what
77. See Bordo et al., supra note 62, at 6; see also Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism
Reforms in the European Union and the Greek Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127, 131 (2010).
78. Kelemen & Teo, supra note 8, at 365.
79. Jones, supra note 32.
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conditions they can be effective. First, to be effective, balanced budget
rules must be clear. As discussed above, it is bond markets and not
courts that enforce balanced budget rules, and bond markets can only
effectively enforce these rules where they are clear. The balanced
budget rules in the Fiscal Compact are far too ambiguous to serve as an
effective focal point for enforcement by bond markets.
But in the EU context, the solution cannot simply be to impose
clearer, nominal balanced budget rules on Eurozone members. In
practice, it would be untenable for the European Union to adopt
national balanced budget rules clear enough to work effectively without
dramatically increasing the EU budget and its capacity to engage in
countercyclical policies. U.S. states can only sustain their relatively
clear nominal balanced budget rules (which lead them to impose pro-
cyclical austerity measures during recessions) because the federal
government can engage in countercyclical fiscal policy-using deficit
spending to stimulate the economy during economic downturns.
Imposing such nominal balanced budget rules on Member States
remains economically undesirable and politically unsustainable in the
European Union, where the "federal" budget remains tiny and incapable
of supporting significant countercyclical policies in periods of recession.
Already, the recent electoral victory of the radical, anti-austerity Syriza
party in Greece suggests that the imposition of austerity at the Member
State level in the absence of significant countercyclical policies from the
EU level is not politically tenable over the long-term.
Finally, however clear the balanced budget rules adopted by states,
bond markets will only act to enforce these effectively if the federal
government has established a credible commitment not to bail out
insolvent states. Most likely, the only way to make that commitment
credible is to actually allow one or more Member States to default as the
United States did in the early 1840s. Whether EU leaders are willing to
countenance the risks associated with the default and possible exit from
the Eurozone of a Member State remains to be seen. But clearly, the
defiant Greek government led by the leftist, anti-austerity Syriza party
is providing them with a tempting target. In the months since Syriza
came to power on promises of ending Eurozone imposed austerity, its
creditors have mostly held the line, demanding that Greece continue to
meet the conditions attached to its bailout loans.80 Key creditors such as
Germany have indicated that if Greece is unwilling to meet those
80. Karl Navarra, Rainer Buergin, and Paul Tugwell, Germany Rejects Loan Request
Saying Greece Must Meet Conditions, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 19, 2015, available at http:lwww.
bloomberg.com/authors/AOXQCpopcGQ/paul-tugwell.
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conditions, they may allow them to default and exit the Eurozone
despite the risks involved.81
81. Nikolaus Blome, Giorgos Christides, Christian Reiermann and Gregor Peter
Schmitz, Grexit Grumblings: Germany Open to Possible Greek Eurozone Exit, SPIEGEL
ONLINE INTERNATIONAL (Jan. 5, 2015), available at http://www.spiegel.de/international
europe/merkel-and-germany-open-to-possible-greek-euro-zone-exit-a-1011277.html.
